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Abstract—Data used to train machine learning models can
be adversarial–maliciously constructed by adversaries to fool
the model. Challenge also arises by privacy, confidentiality, or
due to legal constraints when data are geographically gathered
and stored across multiple learners, some of which may hold
even an “anonymized” or unreliable dataset. In this context, the
distributionally robust optimization framework is considered for
training a parametric model, both in centralized and federated
learning settings. The objective is to endow the trained model
with robustness against adversarially manipulated input data, or,
distributional uncertainties, such as mismatches between training
and testing data distributions, or among datasets stored at
different workers. To this aim, the data distribution is assumed
unknown, and lies within a Wasserstein ball centered around
the empirical data distribution. This robust learning task entails
an infinite-dimensional optimization problem, which is challeng-
ing. Leveraging a strong duality result, a surrogate is obtained,
for which three stochastic primal-dual algorithms are developed:
i) stochastic proximal gradient descent with an -accurate oracle,
which invokes an oracle to solve the convex sub-problems; ii)
stochastic proximal gradient descent-ascent, which approximates
the solution of the convex sub-problems via a single gradient
ascent step; and, iii) a distributionally robust federated learning
algorithm, which solves the sub-problems locally at different
workers where data are stored. Compared to the empirical
risk minimization and federated learning methods, the proposed
algorithms offer robustness with little computation overhead.
Numerical tests using image datasets showcase the merits of the
proposed algorithms under several existing adversarial attacks
and distributional uncertainties.
Index Terms—Wasserstein distance, distributionally robust
optimization, minimax, primal-dual, federated learning.
I. INTRODUCTION
Recent advances in machine learning typically hinge on the
premise that the training data are trustworthy, reliable, and
representative of the testing data. In practice however, data
are usually generated and stored in geographically distributed
devices (a.k.a., workers) each equipped with limited com-
puting capability, due to data privacy, confidentiality, and/or
cost associated with storing data in a centralized location
[15]. Unfortunately, the data quality at edge devices is not al-
ways guaranteed, where adversarially generated examples and
distribution shift across users or between training and testing
data distributions may be present [17]. Visually imperceptible
perturbations to a dermatoscopic image of a benign mole
can render the first-ever artificial intelligence (AI) diagnostic
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system approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Administration in
2018, to classify it as cancerous with 100% confidence [7]. A
stranger wearing pixelated sunglasses can fool even the most
advanced facial recognition software in a home security sys-
tem to mistake it for the homeowner [28]. Hackers indeed
manipulated readings of field devices and control centers of
the Ukrainian supervisory control and data acquisition system
to result in the first ever cyberattack-caused power outage in
2015 [4], [36], [33]. Examples of such failures in widely used
AI-enabled safety- and security-critical systems today could
put our lives and even national infrastructure at risk.
Recent research efforts have focused on devising defense
strategies against adversarial attacks. In general, these defense
strategies can be categorized into two groups: attack detection,
and attack recovery. The former aims to identify whether a
given input is adversarially perturbed [9], [20], while the latter
trains a model with the goal of gaining robustness against
such adversarial inputs [10], [27], which is also the theme
of this work. To robustify learning models against adversarial
data, a multitude of efforts have recently devised data pre-
processing schemes [23], [29], to signify data not adhering
to postulated or nominal data generating models. Adversarial
training, on the other hand, injects such samples into the
training dataset to gain robustness [8]. Generating adversarial
samples was initially proposed in [8], by adding imperceptible
well-crafted noise to clean input data. Similar ideas have also
been developed since then by e.g., [21], [24], [25]; see [5] for
a recent survey. In these contributions, certain optimization
tasks are employed to craft adversarial perturbations. Despite
their empirical success, solving the optimization problems is
challenging in general. Furthermore, theoretical properties of
these approaches have not been well understood, which limits
the explainability of obtained models. In addition, one needs to
judiciously tune hyper parameters of the attack model, which
might be cumbersome in practice.
On the other hand, data are typically generated and/or stored
in multiple geographically distributed workers, where each
worker may have a different data distribution. While keeping
data localized due to e.g., data privacy, communication- and
computation-overhead, the federated learning (FL) paradigm
targets a global model by leveraging limited computational
capabilities of the devices, which are coordinated by a central
parameter server [15]. Existing works in FL have mainly
focused on the communication and computation tradeoff by
aggregating model updates from the learners; see e.g., [22],
[16], [34], [30] and references therein. Only a few works have
explored robust FL. Learning from non i.i.d data through e.g.,
sparsification [18] and ensemble of untrusted sources [13],
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2constitutes recent progress. These methods are mostly heuris-
tic, and have focused on appropriate aggregation schemes
to gain robustness. This context, motivates well a principled
approach that characterizes the uncertainties associated with
underlying data distributions.
Tapping on a distributionally robust optimization perspec-
tive, this paper develops robust learning procedures that re-
spects robustness to distributional uncertainties and adversarial
attacks. The true data distribution is assumed unknown, but
i.i.d. samples can be drawn. Following [31], the adversarial
input perturbations are modeled through a Wasserstein ball,
and we are interested in a robust model that minimizes the
worst-case expected loss over this Wasserstein ball of data
distributions. Unfortunately, the resulting task involves an
infinite-dimensional optimization problem, which is challeng-
ing in general. Invoking a strong duality result, a tractable and
equivalent unconstrained minimization problem is obtained,
which requires solely the empirical data distribution. To tackle
this problem, this paper develops a stochastic proximal gradi-
ent descent (SPGD) algorithm with -accurate oracle, and its
lightweight variant stochastic proximal gradient descent-ascent
(SPGDA). The first algorithm relies on the oracle to solve the
emerging convex sub-problems to -accuracy, while the second
simply approximates its solution via a single gradient ascent
step. In addition, to accommodate (possibly untrusted) datasets
distributed across multiple workers due to privacy issues
and/or the communication overhead, a distributionally robust
federated learning (DRFL) algorithm is further developed. In
a nutshell, the main contributions of this present paper are:
• A distributionally robust learning framework to endow
machine learning models with robustness against adver-
sarial input perturbations;
• Two scalable distributionally robust optimization algo-
rithms with convergence guarantees; and,
• A distributionally robust federated learning implementa-
tion to account for untrusted and possibly anonymized
data from multiple distributed sources.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Problem
formulation and its robust surrogate are provided in Section
II. The proposed SPGD with -accurate oracle and SPGDA
algorithms with their convergence analyses are presented in
Sections III and IV, respectively. The DRFL implementation is
discussed in Section V. Numerical tests are given in Section VI
with conclusions drawn in Section VII. Technical proofs are
deferred to the Appendix.
Notation. Bold lowercase letters denote column vectors
and calligraphic upper case letters are reserved for sets; E[·]
represents expectation; ∇ denotes the gradient operator; (·)>
denotes transposition, and ‖x‖ is the 2-norm of the vector x.
II. PROBLEM STATEMENT
Consider the following standard regularized statistical learn-
ing problem
min
θ∈Θ
Ez∼P0
[
`(θ; z)
]
+ r(θ) (1)
where `(θ; z) denotes the loss of a model parameterized by a
set of unknowns θ on a datum z =(x, y), with feature x and
label y, drawn from some nominal distribution z ∼ P0. Here,
Θ denotes the feasible set for model parameters. To prevent
over fitting or incorporate prior information, regularization
term r(θ) is oftentimes added to the expected loss. Popular
choices for the regularization term include r(θ) := β‖θ‖21
or β‖θ‖22, where β ≥ 0 is a hyper-parameter controlling the
importance of the regularization term.
In practice, the nominal distribution P0 is typically un-
known. Instead, we are given some data samples {zn}Nn=1∼
P̂
(N)
0 (a.k.a. training data), which are drawn i.i.d from P0.
Replacing P0 with the so-called empirical distribution P̂
(N)
0
in (1), we arrive at the empirical loss minimization
min
θ∈Θ
E¯
z∼P̂ (N)0
[
`(θ; z)
]
+ r(θ) (2)
where E¯
z∼P̂ (N)0
[`(θ; z)] =N−1
∑N
n=1`(θ; zn). Indeed, a va-
riety of machine learning tasks can be formulated as (2),
including e.g., ridge- and Lasso regression, logistic regres-
sion, and even reinforcement learning problems. The resultant
models obtained by solving (2) however, have been shown
vulnerable to adversarially corrupted data in P̂ (N)0 . Further,
the testing data distribution often deviates from the avail-
able P̂ (N)0 . Therefore, targeting an adversarially robust model
against a set of distributions achievable by perturbing the
underlying data distribution, the following formulation has
been considered [31]
min
θ∈Θ
sup
P∈P
Ez∼P [`(θ; z)] + r(θ) (3)
where P represents a set of distributions centered around the
data generating distribution P̂ (N)0 . Compared with (1), the
worst-case formulation (3), yields models ensuring reasonable
performance across a continuum of distributions characterized
by P . In practice, different types of ambiguity sets P can be
considered, and they lead to different robustness guarantees
and computational complexities. Popular choices of P include
momentum [6], [35], KL divergence [11], statistical test [1],
and Wasserstein distance-based ambiguity sets [1], [31]; see
e.g., [3] for a recent overview. Among all choices, it has been
shown that Wasserstein ambiguity set P results in a tractable
realization of (3), in terms of strong duality result [1], [31],
which also motivates this work.
To formalize this, consider two probability measures P and
Q supported on a set Z , and let Π(P,Q) be the set of all
joint measures supported on Z2, with marginals P and Q.
Let c : Z×Z → [0,∞) be a cost function measuring the cost
of transporting a unit of mass from z in P to another element
z′ in Q. The celebrated optimal transport problem is given by
[32, page 111]
Wc(P,Q) := inf
pi∈Π
Epi
[
c(z, z′)
]
. (4)
Remark 1. If c(·, ·) satisfies the axioms of distance, then Wc
defines a distance on the space of probability measures. For
instance, if P and Q are defined over a Polish space equipped
with metric d, then choosing c(z, z′) = dp(z, z′) for some p ∈
[1,∞) asserts that W 1/pc (P,Q) is the well-known Wasserstein
distance of order p between probability measures P and Q [32,
Definition 6.1].
3For a given empirical distribution P̂ (N)0 , let us define
uncertainty set P := {P |Wc(P, P̂ (N)0 ) ≤ ρ} to include
all probability distributions having at most ρ-distance from
P
(N)
0 . Incorporating this ambiguity set into (3), results in the
following reformulation
min
θ∈Θ
sup
P
Ez∼P [`(θ; z)] + r(θ) (5a)
s.t. Wc(P, P̂
(N)
0 ) ≤ ρ. (5b)
Observe that the inner supremum in (5a) runs over all joint
probability measures pi on Z2 implicitly characterized by (5b).
Intuitively, directly solving this optimization over the infinite-
dimensional space of distribution functions is challenging, if
not impossible. Fortunately, for a broad range of losses as
well as transportation cost functions, it has been shown that
the inner maximization satisfies strong duality condition [3];
that is the optimal objective of this inner maximization and
its Lagrangian dual optimal objective are equal. In addition,
the dual problem involves optimization over a one-dimensional
dual variable. These two observations make it possible to solve
(3) in the dual domain. To formally obtain a tractable surrogate
to (5), we make the following assumptions.
Assumption 1. The transportation cost function c : Z ×
Z → [0,∞), is a lower semi-continuous function satisfying
c(z, z) = 0 for z ∈ Z1.
Assumption 2. The loss function ` : Θ × Z → [0,∞), is
upper semi-continuous and integrable.
The following proposition provides a tractable surrogate for
(5), whose proof can be found in [3, Theorem 1].
Proposition 1. Let ` : Θ × Z → [0,∞), and c : Z × Z →
[0,∞) satisfy Assumptions 1 and 2, respectively. Then, for any
given P̂ (N)0 , and ρ > 0, it holds that
sup
P∈P
Ez∼P [`(θ; z)] =
inf
γ≥0
{
E¯
z∼P̂ (N)0
[
sup
ζ∈Z
{`(θ; ζ)−γ(c(z, ζ)− ρ)} ]}. (6)
where P :=
{
P |Wc(P, P̂ (N)0 ) ≤ ρ
}
.
Remark 2. Thanks to strong duality, the right-hand side in
(6) simply is a univariate dual reformulation of the primal
problem represented in the left-hand side. In sharp contrast
with the primal formulation, the expectation in the dual domain
is taken only over the empirical distribution P̂ (N)0 rather than
any P ∈ P . In addition, since this reformulation circumvents
the need for finding optimal coupling pi ∈ Π to form P ,
and characterizing the primal objective for all P ∈ P , it is
practically more convenient.
Upon relying on Proposition 1, the following distribution-
ally robust surrogate is obtained
min
θ∈Θ
inf
γ≥0
{
E¯
z∼P̂ (N)0
[
sup
ζ∈Z
{`(θ; ζ)+γ(ρ− c(z, ζ))}+ r(θ)]}.
(7)
1A simple example satisfying these constraints is the Euclidean distance
c(z,z′) = ‖z − z′‖.
Remark 3. The robust surrogate in (3) falls into minimax
(saddle-point) optimization. There are a vast majority of works
to solve this kind of problems, see e.g., [19]. However, the
surrogate reformulation in (7), requires that the supremum be
solved separately for each sample z, and the problem can not
be handled through existing methods.
A relaxed (hence suboptimal) version of (7) with a fixed γ
value has recently been studied in [31]. Unfortunately, one has
to select an appropriate γ value using cross validation over a
grid search that is also application dependent. Heuristically
choosing a γ does not guarantee optimality in solving the
distributionally robust surrogate (7). Clearly, the effect of
heuristically selecting γ is more pronounced when training
deep neural networks. Instead, we advocate algorithms that
optimize γ and θ simultaneously.
Our approach to addressing this, relies on the structure of
(7) to iteratively update parameters θ¯ := [θ> γ]> and ζ. To
end up with a differentiable function of θ¯ after maximizing
over ζ, Danskin’s theorem requires the sup-problem to have
a unique solution [2]. For this reason, we design the inner
maximization to involve a strongly concave objective function
through the selection of a strongly convex transportation cost,
such as c(z, z′) := ‖z−z′‖2p for p ≥ 1. For the maximization
over ζ to rely on a strongly concave objective, we let γ ∈
Γ := {γ|γ > γ0}, where γ0 is large enough. Since γ is the
dual variable corresponding to the constraint in (5), having
γ ∈ Γ is tantamount to tuning ρ which in turn controls the
level of robustness. Replacing γ ≥ 0 in (7) with γ ∈ Γ, our
robust learning model is obtained as the solution of
min
θ∈Θ
inf
γ∈Γ
E¯
z∼P̂ (T )0
[
sup
ζ∈Z
ψ(θ¯, ζ; z)
]
+ r(θ¯) (8)
where ψ(θ¯, ζ; z) := `(θ; ζ)+γ(ρ−c(z, ζ)). Intuitively, input
z in (8) is pre-processed by maximizing ψ accounting for
the adversarial perturbation. To iteratively solve our objective
in (8), ensuing sections provides efficient solvers under some
mild conditions. Including, settings where we can solve every
inner maximization (supremum) to -optimality by an oracle.
Before developing our algorithms, we start by making
several standard assumptions.
Assumption 3. c(z, ·) is Lc-Lipschitz and µ-strongly convex
function for any given z ∈ Z , with respect to the norm ‖ · ‖.
Assumption 4. `(θ; z) satisfies the following Lipschitz
smoothness conditions
‖∇θ`(θ; z)−∇θ`(θ′; z)‖∗ ≤ Lθθ‖θ − θ′‖ (9a)
‖∇θ`(θ; z)−∇θ`(θ; z′)‖∗ ≤ Lθz‖z − z′‖ (9b)
‖∇z`(θ; z)−∇z`(θ; z′)‖∗ ≤ Lzz‖z − z′‖ (9c)
‖∇z`(θ; z)−∇z`(θ′; z)‖∗ ≤ Lzθ‖θ − θ′‖ (9d)
and it is continuously differentiable with respect to θ.
Assumption (4) would guarantee the supremum in (7)
results in a smooth function of θ¯, therefore one can execute
gradient descent to update θ upon solving the supremum.
This will further help to provide convergence analysis of our
proposed algorithms. To elaborate more on this, following
4Algorithm 1: SPGD with -accurate oracle
Input : Initial guess θ¯0, step size sequence
{αt > 0}Tt=0, -accurate oracle
1 for t = 1, . . . , T do
2 Draw i.i.d samples {zn}Nn=1
3 Find -optimizer ζ(θ¯t; zn) via the oracle
4 Update:
θ¯t+1 =
proxαtr
[
θ¯t− αtN
∑N
n=1∇θ¯ψ(θ¯, ζ(θ¯t; zn); zn)
∣∣
θ¯=θ¯t
]
5 end
lemma characterizes smoothness and gradient Lipschitz prop-
erties obtained upon solving the maximization problem in (8).
Lemma 1. For each z ∈ Z , let us define ψ¯(θ¯; z) =
supζ ψ(θ¯, ζ; z) with ζ∗(θ¯; z) := arg maxζ∈Z ψ(θ¯, ζ; z).
Then ψ¯(·) is differentiable, and its gradient is ∇θ¯ψ¯(θ¯; z) =
∇θ¯ψ(θ¯, ζ∗(θ¯; z); z). Moreover, the following conditions hold
∥∥ζ∗(θ¯1; z)− ζ∗(θ¯2; z)∥∥ ≤ Lzθ
λ
‖θ2 − θ1‖+ Lc
λ
‖γ2 − γ1‖
(10a)
and∥∥∇θ¯ψ¯(θ¯1; z)−∇θ¯ψ¯(θ¯2; z)∥∥ ≤ LθzLc + L2cλ ‖γ2 − γ1‖
+(Lθθ +
LθzLzθ + LcLzθ
λ
)‖θ2−θ1‖. (10b)
where γ1,2 ∈ Γ, and ψ(θ¯, ·; z) is λ-strongly concave.
Proof: See Appendix VIII-A for the proof.
Lemma 1 paves the way for iteratively solving the surrogate
optimization (8), intuitively because it guarantees a differen-
tiable and smooth objective upon solving the inner supremum
to its optimum.
Remark 4. Equation (10a) is of practical merits. It ensures
if θ¯t = [θt, γt] is updated with a small enough step size, the
corresponding ζ∗(θt+1; z) is close enough to ζ∗(θt; z). Build-
ing on this observation, instead of using an oracle to find
the optimum ζ∗(θt+1; z), an -accurate solution ζ(θt+1; z)
suffices to obtain similar performance. Enticingly, this circum-
vents the need to find the optimum for the inner maximization
per iteration, which could be computationally demanding.
III. STOCHASTIC PROXIMAL GRADIENT DESCENT WITH
-ACCURATE ORACLE
A standard approach to solving regularized optimization
problems is the proximal gradient algorithm. In this section,
we develop a variant of this method to tackle the robust
surrogate (8). For convenience, let us define
f(θ, γ) := E
[
sup
ζ∈Z
{`(θ; ζ)+γ(ρ− c(z, ζ))} ] (11)
and rewrite our objective as follows
min
θ∈Θ
inf
γ∈Γ
F (θ, γ) := f(θ, γ) + r(θ) (12)
where f(θ, γ) is a smooth function defined in (11), and r(·) is
a non-smooth and convex regularizer, such as `1-norm. With
slight abuse of notation, upon introducing θ¯ := [θ γ], we
define f(θ¯) := f(θ, γ) and F (θ¯) := F (θ, γ). The proximal
gradient algorithm updates θ¯t, as follows
θ¯t+1 = arg min
θ
αtr(θ) + αt
〈
θ − θ¯t, g(θ¯t)〉+ 1
2
∥∥θ − θ¯t∥∥2
where g(θ¯t) := ∇f(θ¯)|θ¯=θ¯t , and αt > 0 is some step size.
Usually, this update is expressed in a compact form
θ¯t+1 = proxαtr
[
θ¯t − αtg(θ¯t)
]
(13)
where the proximal gradient operator is defined as
proxαr[v] := arg min
θ
αr(θ) +
1
2
‖θ − v‖2. (14)
The working assumption is that this optimization problem can
be solved efficiently using off-the-shelf solvers.
Starting from some guess θ¯0, the proposed SPGD with -
accurate oracle executes two steps at every iteration t = 1,
2, . . .. First, it relies on an -accurate maximum oracle to solve
the inner problem supζ∈Z{`(θt; ζ)−γtc(z, ζ)} for randomly
drawn samples {zn}Nn=1 to yield -optimal ζ(θ¯t, zn) with the
corresponding objective values ψ(θ¯t, ζ(θ¯t, zn); zn). Next, θ¯t
is updated using a stochastic proximal gradient step as follows
θ¯t+1 = proxαtr
[
θ¯t − αt
N
N∑
n=1
∇θ¯ψ(θ¯, ζ(θ¯t; zn); zn)
]
.
For implementation, the proposed SPGD algorithm with -
accurate oracle is summarized in Alg. 1. Convergence perfor-
mance of this algorithm is analyzed in the ensuing subsection.
A. Convergence of SPGD with -accurate oracle
In general, the postulated model is nonlinear, and the
robust surrogate objective function F (θ¯) is nonconvex. In this
section, we characterize the convergence performance of Alg.
1 to a stationary point. However, due to the nonconvexity and
nonsmoothness, stationary points are defined in the sense of
Fre`chet subgradient. Specifically, for the composite optimiza-
tion (12), the Fre`chet subgradient ∂F (θˇ) is a set defined as
follows [26]
∂F (θˇ) :=
{
v
∣∣ lim
θ¯→θˇ
inf
F (θ¯)− F (θˇ)− v>(θ¯ − θˇ))
‖θ¯ − θˇ‖ ≥ 0
}
.
Consequently, the distance between vector 0 and the set ∂F (θˇ)
is a measure to characterize whether a point is stationary or
not. To this aim, let us define the distance between a vector v
and a set S as dist(v,S) := mins∈S ‖v − s‖. In this paper,
we consider this notion of distance as well as the concept of
δ-stationary points as defined below.
Definition 1. Given a small δ > 0, we call vector θˇ a δ-
stationary point if and only if dist(0, ∂F (θˇ)) ≤ δ.
Since f(·) in (11) is smooth, we have that ∂F (θ¯) =
∇f(θ¯) + ∂r(θ¯) [26]. Hence, it suffices to prove that the
algorithm converges to a δ-stationary point θˇ satisfying
dist
(
0,∇f(θˇ) + ∂r(θˇ)) ≤ δ. (15)
5To proceed, the following standard assumption in stochastic
optimization is made here.
Assumption 5. The function f satisfies the next assumptions.
1) The gradient estimates are unbiased and have a bounded
variance, i.e., E[g∗(θ¯t) −∇f(θ¯t)] = 0, and there is a
constant σ2 <∞, so that E[‖∇f(θ¯t)−g∗(θ¯t)‖22] ≤ σ2.
2) The function f(θ¯) is smooth with Lf -Lipschitz continu-
ous gradient, i.e., ‖∇f(θ¯1)−∇f(θ¯2)‖ ≤ Lf‖θ¯1− θ¯2‖.
On top of Assumption 5 and Definition 1, the next theorem
provides convergence guarantees for Alg. 1, whose proof is
postponed to Appendix VIII-B.
Theorem 1. Let Alg. 1 run for T iterations with constant
step sizes α, η > 0. Under Assumptions 1–5, Alg. 1 generates
a sequence of {θ¯t} that satisfies
E [dist(0, ∂F (θ¯t
′
))2] ≤ ( 2
α
+ β
)∆F
T
+
(β
η
+ 2
)
σ2
+
(β + 2)L2
θ¯z

λ0
(16)
where t′ is uniformly sampled from {1, . . . , T}; here, ∆F :=
F (θ¯0) − F (θ¯T+1); L2
θ¯z
:= L2θz + λ0Lc, and β, λ0 > 0 are
some constants.
Theorem 1 implies the sequence {θ¯t}Tt=1 generated by Alg.
1, converges to a stationary point on average. The upper bound
here is characterized by the initial error ∆F , which decays at
the rate ofO(1/T ); and, the constant bias terms induced by the
gradient estimate variance σ2 as well as the oracle accuracy .
Remark 5 (Oracle implementation). The -accurate oracle can
be implemented in practice by several optimization algorithms.
Due to its simplicity, gradient ascent is a desirable solu-
tion. Assuming γ0 ≥ Lzz/µ, gradient ascent with constant
step size η obtains an -accurate solution within at most
O(log(d20/η)) iterations, where d0 is the diameter of set Z .
The computational complexity of Alg. 1 becomes cumber-
some when dealing with large-size datasets and complex mod-
els. This motivates lightweight, scalable, yet efficient meth-
ods. To this aim, our stochastic proximal gradient descent-
ascent (SPGDA) algorithm is introduced next.
IV. STOCHASTIC PROXIMAL GRADIENT
DESCENT-ASCENT
Leveraging the strong concavity of the inner maximization
problem and Lemma 1, a lightweight variant of the SPGD with
-accurate oracle is developed here. Instead of optimizing the
inner maximization problem to -accuracy by an oracle, we
approximate its solution with only a single gradient ascent
step. Specifically, at every iteration t, for a batch of data
{ztm}Mm=1, our SPGDA algorithm first perturbs each data
sample via a gradient ascent step
ζtm = z
t
m + ηt∇ζψ(θ¯t, ζ; ztm)
∣∣
ζ=ztm
, ∀m = 1, . . . ,M (17)
then forms
gt(θ¯t) :=
1
M
M∑
m=1
∇θ¯ψ(θ¯, ζtm; ztm)
∣∣
θ¯=θ¯t
. (18)
Algorithm 2: SPGDA
Input : Initial guess θ¯0, step size sequence
{αt, ηt > 0}Tt=0, batch size M
1 for t = 1, . . . , T do
2 Draw a batch of i.i.d samples {zm}Mm=1
3 Find {ζtm}Mm=1 via gradient ascent:
ζtm = z
t
m+ηt∇ζψ(θ¯t, ζ; ztm)
∣∣
ζ=ztm
, m = 1, . . . ,M
Update:
θ¯t+1 =
proxαtr
[
θ¯t − αtM
∑M
m=1∇θ¯ψ(θ¯t, ζtm; ztm)
∣∣
θ¯=θ¯t
]
4 end
Having this stochastic gradient, the proposed SPGDA again
takes a proximal gradient step
θ¯t+1 = proxαtr
[
θ¯t − αtgt(θ¯t)
]
. (19)
The SPGDA steps are summarized in Alg. 2. Besides its
simplicity and scalability, SPGDA enjoys convergence to a
stationary point as elaborated below.
A. Convergence of SPGDA
To establish the convergence of Alg. 2, let us define
g∗(θ¯t) :=
1
M
M∑
m=1
∇θ¯ψ∗(θ¯t, ζ∗m; ztm). (20)
Different from (18), the gradient here is obtained at the
optimum ζ∗m. To provide the convergence result, the following
assumption is made.
Assumption 6. The function f satisfies the next assumptions.
1) Gradient estimates ∇θ¯ψ∗(θ¯t, ζ∗m; zm) at ζ∗m are un-
biased and have bounded variance. That is, for m =
1 · · ·M , we have E [∇θ¯ψ∗(θ, ζ∗m; zm) − ∇θ¯f(θ)] = 0
and E [‖∇θ¯ψ∗(θ, ζ∗m; zm)−∇f(θ)‖2] ≤ σ2.
2) The expected norm of gt(θ¯) is bounded, that is,
E‖gt(θ¯)‖2 ≤ B2.
The following theorem presents convergence guarantees for
Alg. 2, whose proof is provided in Appendix VIII-C.
Theorem 2 (Convergence of Alg. 2). Let ∆F := F (θ¯0) −
inf θ¯ F (θ¯), and denote by D the diameter of feasible set Θ.
Under As. 1–4 and 6, for a constant step size α > 0, and a
fixed batch size M > 0, after T iterations, Alg. 2 satisfies
E
[
dist(0, ∂F (θ¯T ))2
] ≤ υ
T + 1
∆F
+
2L2θzν
M
[
(1− αµ)D2 + α2B2]+ 4σ2
M
(21)
where υ, ν, and µ = γ0 − Lzz are some positive constants.
Theorem 2 that implies the sequence {θ¯t}Tt=1 generated by
Alg. 2 converges to a stationary point. The upper bound in
(21) is characterized by a vanishing term induced by initial
error ∆F , and constant bias terms.
6V. DISTRIBUTIONALLY ROBUST FEDERATED LEARNING
In practice, massive datasets are distributed geographically
across multiple sites, where scalability, data privacy and in-
tegrity, as well as bandwidth scarcity typically discourage
uploading these data to a central server. This has propelled the
so-called federated learning framework where multiple work-
ers exchanging information with a server to learn a central-
ized model using data locally generated and/or stored across
workers [22], [17], [15]. This learning framework necessitates
workers to communicate iteratively with the server. Albeit
appealing for its scalability, one needs to carefully address the
bandwidth bottleneck associated with server-worker links. Fur-
thermore, the workers’ data may have (slightly) different
underlying distributions, thus rendering the learning task chal-
lenging. To seek a model robust to distribution shifts across
workers, we capitalize on the proposed SPGDA algorithm to
design a privacy- and robustness-respecting algorithm.
To that end, consider K workers with each worker k ∈ K
collecting samples {zn(k)}Nn=1. A globally shared model pa-
rameterized by θ is to be updated at the server by aggregating
gradients computed locally per worker. For simplicity, here it
is assumed that workers have the same number of samples
N . Typically, the goal is to learn a single global model
from stored data at all workers by minimizing the following
objective function
min
θ∈Θ
E¯z∼P̂ [`(θ; z)] + r(θ) (22)
where E¯z∼P̂ [`(θ; z)] :=
1
NK
∑N
n=1
∑K
k=1 `(θ, zn(k)). To
endow the learned model with robustness against distributional
uncertainties, our novel formulation aims to solve the follow-
ing problem distributedly
min
θ∈Θ
sup
P∈P
Ez∼P [`(θ; z)] + r(θ)
s. to. P :=
{
P
∣∣∣ K∑
k=1
Wc(P, P̂
(N)(k)) ≤ ρ
}
(23)
where Wc(P, P̂ (N)(k)) denotes the Wasserstein distance be-
tween distribution P and the locally available one P̂ (N)(k),
per worker k.
Clearly, having the constraint P ∈ P , couples the optimiza-
tion problem in (23) across all workers. To offer distributed
implementations, we resort to Proposition 1, to arrive at the
following equivalent reformulation
min
θ∈Θ
inf
γ∈Γ
K∑
k=1
{
E¯z(k)∼P̂ (N)(k)
[
sup
ζ∈Z
{`(θ; ζ)+ (24)
γ(ρ− c(z(k), ζ))} ]}+ r(θ).
Building on the SPGDA algorithm in Section IV, our
communication- and computation-efficient DRFL method is
delineated next.
Specifically, our DRFL hinges on the fact that, at iteration
t, having fixed the server parameters θ¯t := [θt>, γt]>, the
optimization problem becomes separable across all workers.
Hence, upon receiving θ¯t from the server, each worker k ∈ K:
i) samples a minibatch Bt(k) of data from P̂ (N)(k); ii) forms
Algorithm 3: DRFL
Input : Initial guess θ¯1, a set of workers K with data
samples {zn(k)}Nn=1 per worker k ∈ K, step
size sequence {αt, ηt > 0}Tt=1
Output: θ¯T+1
1 for t = 1, . . . , T do
2 Each worker:
3 Samples a minibatch Bt(k) of samples
4 Given θ¯t and z ∈ Bt(k), forms local perturbed loss
ψk(θ¯
t, ζ; z) := `(θ¯t; ζ) + γt(ρ− c(z, ζ))
Lazily maximizes ψk(θ¯t, ζ; z) over ζ to find
ζ(θ¯t; z) = z + ηt∇ζψk(θ¯t, ζ; z)|ζ=z
Computes stochastic gradient
1
|Bt(k)|
∑
z∈Bt(k)
∇θ¯ψk(θ¯t, ζ(θ¯t; z); z)
∣∣
θ¯=θ¯t
and uploads to server
5 Server:
6 Updates θ¯t according to (25)
7 Broadcasts θ¯t+1 to workers
8 end
the perturbed loss ψk(θ¯t, ζ; z) := `(θt; ζ) + γt(ρ − c(z, ζ))
for each z ∈ Bt(k); iii) lazily maximizes ψk(θ¯t, ζ; z) over ζ
using a single gradient ascent step to yield ζ(θ¯t; z) = z +
ηt∇ζψk(θ¯t, ζ; z)|ζ=z; and, iv) sends the stochastic gradient
|Bt(k)|−1∑z∈Bt(k)∇θ¯ψk(θ¯t, ζ(θ¯t; z); z)∣∣θ¯=θ¯t back to the
server. Upon receiving all local gradients, the server updates
θ¯t by following a proximal gradient descent step to obtain
θ¯t+1, that is
θ¯t+1 = proxαtr
[
θ¯t− αt
K
K∑
k=1
1
|Bt(k)|×∑
z∈Bt(k)
∇θ¯ψk(θ¯t, ζ(θ¯t; z); z)
∣∣
θ¯=θ¯t
]
. (25)
which is then broadcast to all workers to begin a new round
of local updates. Our DRFL approach is tabulated in Alg. 3.
VI. NUMERICAL TESTS
To assess the performance against distribution shifts and
adversarial perturbations, empirical evaluations on classify-
ing standard MNIST and Fashion- (F-)MNIST datasets are
presented here. Specifically, we compare performance using
models trained with empirical risk minimization (ERM), the
fast-gradient method (FGSM) [8], its iterated variant (IFGM)
[14], and the Wasserstein robust method (WRM) [31]. We
further investigated the testing performance using the projected
gradient descent (PGD) attack [21]. We start by examining the
performances of SPGD with -accurate oracle and the SPGDA
algorithm on standard classification tasks.
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Fig. 1: Misclassification error rate for different training methods using MNIST dataset.
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Fig. 2: Misclassification error rate for different training methods using F-MNIST dataset.
A. SPGD with -accurate oracle and SPGDA
The FGSM attack performs one step gradient update along
the direction of the sign of gradient to find an adversarial
sample; that is,
xadv = Clip[−1,1]{x+ advsign(∇`x(θ; (x, y)))} (26)
where avd controls maximum `∞ perturbation of adversarial
samples. The element-wise Clip[a,b]{} operator enforces its
input to reside in the prescribed range [−1, 1]. By running
Tadv iterations of (26) iterative (I) FGSM attack samples are
generated [8]. Starting with an initialization x0adv = x, and
considering `∞ norm, the PGD attack iterates [21]
xt+1adv = ΠB(xtadv)
{
xtadv + αsign(∇`x(θ; (xtadv, y)))
}
(27)
for Tadv steps, where Π denotes projection onto the ball
B(xtadv) := {x : ‖x − xtadv‖∞ ≤ adv}, and α > 0 is
the stepsize set to 1 in our experiments. We use Tadv = 10
iterations for all iterative methods both in training and attacks.
The PGD can also be interpreted as an iterative algorithm
that solves the optimization problem maxx′ `(θ; (x′, y)) sub-
ject to ‖x′ − x‖`∞ ≤ α. The Wasserstein attack on the
other hand, generates adversarial samples through solving a
perturbed training loss with a `2-based transportation cost
associated with the Wasserstein distance between the training
and adversarial data distributions [31].
For the MNIST and F-MNIST datasets, a convolutional
neural network (CNN) classifier consisting of 8 × 8, 6 × 6,
and 5 × 5 filter layers with rectified linear units (ReLU) and
the same padding is used. Its first, second, and third layers
have 64, 128, and 128 channels, respectively, followed by a
fully connected layer and a softmax layer at the output.
CNNs with the same architecture are trained, using different
adversarial samples. Specifically, to train a Wasserstein robust
CNN model (WRM), γ = 1 was used to generate Wasserstein
adversarial samples, adv was set to 0.1 for the other two
methods, and ρ = 25 was used to define the uncertainty
set for both Algs. 1 and 2. Unless otherwise noted, we set
the batch size to 128, the number of epochs to 30, the
learning rates to α = 0.001 and η = 0.02, and used the
Adam optimizer [12]. Fig. 1a shows the classification error
on the MNIST dataset. The error rates were obtained using
testing samples generated according to the FGSM method with
adv. Clearly all training methods outperform ERM, and our
proposed Algs. 1 and 2 offer improved performance over com-
peting alternatives. The testing accuracy of all methods using
samples generated according to IFGSM attack is presented in
Fig. 1b. Likewise, Algs. 1 and 2 outperform other methods in
this case. Fig. 1c depicts the testing accuracy of the considered
methods under different levels of PGD attack. The plots in
Fig. 1 showcase the improved performance obtained by CNNs
trained using Algs. 1 and 2.
As for the second experiment, the F-MNIST article image
dataset is adopted. Similar to MNIST dataset, each example in
F-MNIST is also a 28× 28 gray-scale image, associated with
a label from 10 classes. F-MNIST is a modern replacement
for the original MNIST dataset for benchmarking machine
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Fig. 3: Distributionally robust federated learning for image classification using the non-i.i.d. F-MNIST dataset.
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Fig. 4: Federated learning for image classification using the MNIST dataset.
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Fig. 5: Distributionally robust federated learning for image classification using F-MNIST dataset.
learning algorithms. Using CNNs with similar architectures as
before, the classification error is depicted for different training
methods in Fig. 2. Three different attacks, namely FGSM,
IFGSM, and PGD are used during testing. The resulting
classification error rates are reported in Figs. 2a, 2b, and 2c,
respectively. The proposed SPGD and SPGDA algorithms out-
perform the other training methods, verifying the superiority
of Algs. 1 and 2 in terms of yielding robust models.
B. Distributionally robust federated learning
To validate the performance of our DRFL algorithm, we
considered an FL environment consisting of a server and 10
workers, with the local batch size 64, and assigned to every
worker is an equal-sized subset of training data containing
i.i.d. samples from 10 different classes. In addition, it is
assumed that all workers participate in each communication
round. To benchmark the DRFL, we simulated the federated
averaging method [22]. The testing accuracy on the MNIST
dataset per communication round using clean (normal) images
is depicted in Fig. 4a. Clearly, both DRFL and federated
averaging algorithms exhibit reasonable performance when the
data is not corrupted. The performance is further tested against
IFGSM and PGD attacks with a fixed adv = 0.1 during each
communication round, and the corresponding misclassification
error rates are shown in Figs. 4b and 4c, respectively. The
classification performance using federated averaging does not
improve in Fig. 4b, whereas the DRFL keeps improving the
performance across communication rounds. This is a direct
9consequence of accounting for the data uncertainties during
the learning process. Furthermore, Fig. 4c showcases that
the federated averaging becomes even worse as the model
gets progressively trained under the PGD attack. This indeed
motivates our DRFL approach when data are from untrusted
entities with possibly adversarial input perturbations. Simi-
larly, Fig. 5 depicts the misclassification rate of the proposed
DRFL method compared with federated averaging, when using
F-MNIST dataset.
Since the distribution of samples across devices may influ-
ence performance, we further considered a biased local data
setting. In particular, each worker k = 1, . . . , 10 contains
only one class, so the data distributions at workers are highly
perturbed, and data stored across workers are non-i.i.d. The
testing error rate for normal inputs is reported in Fig. 3a, while
the test error against adversarial attacks is shown in Figs. 3b
and 3c. This set of tests shows that having distributional shifts
across workers can indeed enhance testing performance when
the samples are adversarially manipulated.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
A framework to make parametric machine learning models
robust against distributional uncertainties was proposed in
this paper. The learning task was cast as a distributionally
robust optimization problem, for which two scalable stochastic
optimization algorithms were developed. The first algorithm
relies on an -accurate maximum-oracle to solver the inner
convex subproblem, while the second approximates its solution
via a single gradient ascent step. Convergence guarantees
of both algorithms to a stationary point were obtained. The
upshot of the proposed approach is that it is amenable to
federated learning from unreliable datasets across multiple
workers. Our developed DRFL algorithm ensures data pri-
vacy and integrity, while offering robustness with minimal
computational and communication overhead. Numerical tests
for classifying standard real images showcased the merits of
the proposed algorithms against distributional uncertainties
and adversaries. This work also opens up several interesting
directions for future research, including distributionally robust
deep reinforcement learning.
VIII. APPENDIX
A. Proof of Lemma 1
Since function ζ 7→ ψ(θ¯, ζ; z) is λ-strongly concave,
ζ∗(θ¯) = supζ∈Z ψ(θ¯, ζ; z) is unique. In addition, the
first order optimality condition gives 〈∇ζψ(θ¯, ζ∗(θ¯); z), ζ −
ζ∗(θ¯)〉 ≤ 0. Let us define ζ1∗ = ζ∗(θ¯1), and ζ2∗ = ζ∗(θ¯2), and
use strong concavity for any θ¯1 and θ¯2 to write
ψ(θ¯2, ζ
2
∗ ; z) ≤ψ(θ¯2, ζ1∗ ; z) + 〈∇ζψ(θ¯2, ζ1∗ ; z), ζ2∗ − ζ1∗〉
− λ
2
‖ζ2∗ − ζ1∗‖2 (28)
and
ψ(θ¯2, ζ
1
∗ ; z) ≤ ψ(θ¯2, ζ2∗ ; z) + 〈∇ζψ(θ¯2, ζ2∗ ; z), ζ1∗ − ζ2∗〉
− λ
2
‖ζ2∗ − ζ1∗‖2
≤ ψ(θ¯2, ζ2∗ ; z)−
λ
2
‖ζ2∗ − ζ1∗‖2 (29)
where the last inequality is obtained by using the first order
optimality condition. Summing (28) and (29) gives
λ‖ζ2∗ − ζ1∗‖2 ≤ 〈∇ζψ(θ¯2, ζ1∗ ; z), ζ2∗ − ζ1∗〉
≤ 〈∇ζψ(θ¯2, ζ1∗ ; z), ζ2∗ − ζ1∗〉 − 〈∇ζψ(θ¯1, ζ1∗ ; z), ζ2∗ − ζ1∗〉
= 〈∇ζψ(θ¯2, ζ1∗ ; z)−∇ζψ(θ¯1, ζ1∗ ; z), ζ2∗ − ζ1∗〉. (30)
Using Ho¨lder’s inequality we get
λ‖ζ2∗ − ζ1∗‖2 ≤
‖∇ζψ(θ¯2, ζ1∗ ; z)−∇ζψ(θ¯1, ζ1∗ ; z)‖? ‖ζ2∗ − ζ1∗‖. (31)
Therefore,
‖ζ2∗ − ζ1∗‖ ≤
1
λ
‖∇ζψ(θ¯2, ζ1∗ ; z)−∇ζψ(θ¯1, ζ1∗ ; z)‖?. (32)
Using ψ(θ¯, ζ; z) := `(θ; ζ) + γ(ρ− c(z, ζ)), we have that
‖∇ζψ(θ¯2, ζ1∗ ; z)−∇ζψ(θ¯1, ζ1∗ ; z)‖?
= ‖∇ζ`(θ2; ζ1∗)−∇ζ`(θ1; ζ1∗)
+ γ1∇ζc(z, ζ1∗)− γ2∇ζc(z, ζ1∗)‖?
≤ ‖∇ζ`(θ2; ζ1∗)−∇ζ`(θ1; ζ1∗)‖?
+ ‖γ1∇ζc(z, ζ1∗)− γ2∇ζc(z, ζ1∗)‖?
≤ Lzθ‖θ2 − θ1‖+ ‖∇ζc(z, ζ1∗)‖? ‖γ2 − γ1‖. (33)
Substituting (33) into (32) gives
‖ζ2∗ − ζ1∗‖ ≤
Lzθ
λ
‖θ2 − θ1‖+ 1
λ
‖∇ζc(z, ζ1∗)‖? ‖γ2 − γ1‖
≤ Lzθ
λ
‖θ2 − θ1‖+ Lc
λ
‖γ2 − γ1‖. (34)
The last inequality holds since ζ 7→ c(z, ζ) is Lc-Lipschitz
based on the Assumption 3.
To obtain (10b), first without loss of generality we assume
that only a single datum z is given, then to prove the existence
of the gradient of ψ¯(θ¯, z) with respect to θ¯, we resort to the
Danskin’s theorem as follows.
Danskin’s Theorem. Consider the following minimax op-
timization problem
min
θ∈Θ
max
ζ∈X
f(θ, ζ) (35)
where X is a nonempty compact set, and f : Θ × X →
[0,∞) is such that f(·, ζ) is differentiable for any ζ ∈ X , and
∇θf(θ, ζ) is continuous on Θ × X . Let S(θ) := {ζ∗|ζ∗ =
arg maxζ f(θ, ζ)}. Then the function
f¯(θ) := max
ζ∈Z
f(θ, ζ)
is locally Lipschitz and directionally differentiable, where the
directional derivatives satisfy
f¯(θ,d) = sup
ζ∈S(θ)
〈d,∇θf(θ, ζ)〉. (36)
For a given θ, if the set S(θ) is a singleton, then the function
f¯(θ) is differentiable at the θ with gradient
∇θ f¯(θ) = ∇θf(θ, ζ∗(θ)) (37)
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Given θ, and µ-strongly convex function c(z, ·), the
ψ(θ¯, ·; z) is concave if Lzz − γµ < 0, which holds true for
γ0 >
Lzz
µ .
Replacing f¯(θ, ζ) with ψ(θ¯, ζ; z), and given the concavity
of ζ 7→ ψ(θ¯, ζ; z), we have that ψ¯(θ¯; z) is a continuous
function with gradient
∇θ¯ψ¯(θ¯; z) = ∇θ¯ψ¯(θ¯, ζ∗(θ¯; z); z). (38)
Having this result, we can obtain the second inequality, as
follows
‖∇θ¯ψ(θ¯1, ζ1∗ ; z)−∇θ¯ψ(θ¯2, ζ2∗ ; z)‖
≤ ‖∇θ¯ψ(θ¯1, ζ1∗ ; z)−∇θ¯ψ(θ¯1, ζ2∗ ; z)‖
+ ‖∇θ¯ψ(θ¯1, ζ2∗ ; z)−∇θ¯ψ(θ¯2, ζ2∗ ; z)‖
≤
∥∥∥∥[∇θ`(θ1, ζ1∗)−∇θ`(θ1, ζ2∗)c(z, ζ2∗)− c(z, ζ1∗)
]∥∥∥∥
+
∥∥∥∥[∇θ`(θ1, ζ2∗)−∇θ`(θ2, ζ2∗)0
]∥∥∥∥
≤ Lθz‖ζ1∗ − ζ2∗‖+ Lc‖ζ1∗ − ζ2∗‖+ Lθθ‖θ1 − θ2‖
≤ (Lθθ + LθzLzθ + LcLzθ
λ
)‖θ2 − θ1‖
+
LθzLc + L
2
c
λ
‖γ2 − γ1‖ (39)
where we again used inequality (34). As a technical issue,
if the considered model is a neural network with a non-
smooth activation function, the loss will not be continuously
differentiable. However, in practice we oftentimes will not
encounter these points.
B. Proof of Theorem 1
For notational convenience, by abuse of notation let us
define F (θ, γ) := f(θ, γ) + r(θ) + h(γ), where h(γ) is the
indicator function defined as
h(γ) =
{
0, if γ ∈ Γ
∞, if γ /∈ Γ . (40)
where Γ = {γ|γ ≥ γ0}, and for ease of representation we use
r¯(θ¯) := r(θ)+h(γ). Having an Lf–smooth function f , yields
f(θ¯
t+1
) ≤ f(θ¯t) + 〈∇f(θ¯t), θ¯t+1 − θ¯t〉+ Lf
2
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2.
(41)
For a given datum zt, by abuse of notation let us define the
gradients
g∗(θ¯t) :=
[∇θψ(θt, γ, ζ∗(θ¯t; zt); zt)
∂γψ(θ
t, γ, ζ∗(θ¯t; zt); zt)
]
=
[∇θψ(θt, γ, ζ∗(θ¯t; zt); zt)
ρ− c(zt, ζ∗(θ¯t; zt)
]
. (42)
and
g(θ¯
t
) :=
[∇θψ(θt, γ, ζ(θ¯t; zt); zt)
∂γψ(θ
t, γ, ζ(θ¯
t; zt); zt)
]
=
[∇θψ(θt, γ, ζ(θ¯t; zt); zt)
ρ− c(zt, ζ(θ¯t; zt)
]
(43)
obtained by an oracle at the optimal ζ∗ and the -optimal ζ
solvers, respectively. Now, we define the error vector δ(θ¯t) :=
∇f(θ¯t)− g(θ¯t), and replace this into (41) to get
f(θ¯
t+1
) ≤ f(θ¯t) + 〈g(θ¯t) + δ(θ¯t), θ¯t+1 − θ¯t〉
+
Lf
2
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2. (44)
For proximal operator, the following properties are equiva-
lent for any x,y
u = proxαr(x) ⇐⇒ (x− u)T (y − u) ≤ αr(y)− αr(u).
(45)
Replacing u = θ¯t+1 and x = θ¯t − αtg(θ¯t) in (45), we get〈
θ¯
t − αtg(θ¯t)− θ¯t+1, θ¯t − θ¯t+1
〉 ≤ αtr¯(θ¯t)− αtr¯(θ¯t+1).
Upon rearranging, we obtain〈
g(θ¯
t
), θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t〉 ≤ r¯(θ¯t)− r¯(θ¯t+1)− 1
αt
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2.
(46)
Adding inequalities in (46) and (44) gives
f(θ¯
t+1
) ≤ f(θ¯t) + 〈δ(θ¯t), θ¯t+1 − θ¯t〉+ Lf
2
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2
+ r¯(θ¯
t
)− r¯(θ¯t+1)− 1
αt
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2
and we use F (θ¯) := f(θ¯) + r¯(θ¯) to obtain
F (θ¯
t+1
)−F (θ¯t) ≤ 〈δ(θ¯t), θ¯t+1 − θ¯t〉
+
(Lf
2
− 1
αt
)∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2. (47)
Using Young’s inequality, in which for any η > 0 gives〈
δ(θ¯
t
), θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t〉 ≤ η2‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2 + 12η‖δ(θ¯t)‖2, yielding
F (θ¯
t+1
)−F (θ¯t) ≤
(Lf + η
2
− 1
αt
)∥∥θ¯t+1−θ¯t∥∥2 + ∥∥δ(θ¯t)∥∥2
2η
.
(48)
Next we are going to bound δ(θ¯t) := ∇f(θ¯t)−g(θ¯t). By
adding and subtracting g∗(θ¯t) to the right hand side, we get
‖δ(θ¯t)‖2 ≤ 2‖∇f(θ¯t)− g∗(θ¯t)‖2 + 2‖g∗(θ¯t)− g(θ¯t)‖2.
(49)
Due to the Lipschitz smoothness of the gradient, it holds
that∥∥g∗(θ¯t)− g(θ¯t)∥∥2
=
∥∥∥∥∥
[∇θψ(θt, γ, ζ∗(θ¯t; zt); zt)
ρ− c(zt, ζ∗(θ¯t; zt)
]
−
[∇θψ(θt, γ, ζ(θ¯t; zt); zt)
ρ− c(zt, ζ(θ¯t; zt)
] ∥∥∥∥∥
2
=
∥∥∇θψ(θt, γ, ζ∗(θ¯t; zt); zt)−∇θψ(θt, γ, ζ(θ¯t; zt); zt)∥∥2
+
∥∥c(zt, ζt∗)− c(zt, ζt)∥∥2
(a)
≤
(L2θz
λt
+ Lc
)
‖ζt∗ − ζt‖2
(b)
≤
(L2θz
λt
+ Lc
)

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≤
(L2θz
λ0
+ Lc
)
 (50)
where (a) uses the λt = µγt − Lzz strong-concavity of ζ 7→
ψ(θ¯, γ, ζ; z), and the second term is bounded by Lc‖ζt∗−ζt‖2
according to Assumption 3. The last inequality holds for λ0 :=
µγ0 −Lzz , where we used (40) to bound γt ≥ γ0 > Lzz . So
far, we have established the following
‖g∗(θ¯t)− g(θ¯t)‖2 ≤ L
2
θ¯z

λ0
(51)
where for notational convenience we used L2
θ¯z
= L2θz+λ0Lc.
Upon replacing (51) into (49), we bound the error as follows
‖δ(θ¯t)‖2 ≤ 2‖∇f(θ¯t)− g∗(θ¯t)‖2 + 2L
2
θ¯z

λ0
. (52)
Combining (48) and (50) yields
F (θ¯
t+1
)− F (θ¯t) ≤
(Lf + η
2
− 1
αt
)∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2
+
1
η
∥∥∇f(θ¯t)− g∗(θ¯t)∥∥2 + L2θ¯z
ηλ0
.
(53)
Considering a constant step size α and summing these inequal-
ities over t = 1, . . . , T yields( 1
α
−Lf + η
2
) T∑
t=0
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2 ≤ F (θ¯0)− F (θ¯T )+
1
η
T∑
t=0
∥∥∇f(θ¯t)− g∗(θ¯t)∥∥2 + (T + 1)L2θ¯z
λ0
. (54)
From proximal gradient update
θ¯
t+1
= arg min
θ
αr¯(θ) + α
〈
θ − θ¯t, g(θ¯t)〉+ 1
2
∥∥θ − θ¯t∥∥2
(55)
clearly, due to optimality of θ¯t+1 in (55), it holds that
r¯(θ¯
t+1
) +
〈
θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t, g(θ¯t)〉+ 1
2α
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2 ≤ r¯(θ¯t)
(56)
which combined with the smoothness of f (c.f. (41)) yields〈
θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t, g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)〉+( 1
2α
− Lf
2
)∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2
≤ F (θ¯t)− F (θ¯t+1) (57)
Subtracting 〈θ¯t+1 − θ¯t,∇f(θ¯t+1)〉 from both sides gives〈
θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t), g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1)〉+ ( 1
2α
− Lf
2
)∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2
≤ F (θ¯t)− F (θ¯t+1)− 〈θ¯t+1 − θ¯t,∇f(θ¯t+1)−∇f(θ¯t)〉.
By forming
∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1)+ 1α (θ¯t+1− θ¯t)∥∥2 on the left
hand side and adding relevant terms to the right hand side, we
arrive at∥∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1
α
(θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t)
∥∥∥2
≤ ∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1)∥∥2 + 1
α2
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2
+
(Lf
α
− 1
α2
)∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2 + 2
α
(
F (θ¯
t
)− F (θ¯t+1))
− 2
α
〈
θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t,∇f(θ¯t+1)−∇f(θ¯t)〉
≤ ∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2 + 1
α2
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2
+ (
Lf
α
− 1
α2
)
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2 + 2
α
(
F (θ¯
t
)− F (θ¯t+1))
− 2
α
〈
θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t),∇f(θ¯t+1)−∇f(θ¯t)〉
≤ ∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2 + 1
α2
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2
+
(Lf
α
− 1
α2
)∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2 + 2
α
(
F (θ¯
t
)− F (θ¯t+1))
+
η
α
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2 + L2f
η
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2. (58)
Here the last inequality is obtained by applying Young’s
inequality and then using the Lf -Lipschitz continuity of func-
tion f(·). By simplifying the last inequality we get∥∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1
α
(θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t)
∥∥∥2
≤ ∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)∥∥2 + 2
α
(
F (θ¯
t
)− F (θ¯t+1))
+
(L2f
η
+
Lf + η
α
)∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2. (59)
The first term in the right hand side can be bounded by adding
and subtracting g∗(θ¯t) and using (51), to arrive at∥∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1
α
(θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t)
∥∥∥2
≤ 2∥∥∇f(θ¯t)− g∗(θ¯t)∥∥2 2L2θ¯
λ0
+
2
α
(
F (θ¯
t
)− F (θ¯t+1))
+
(L2f
η
+
Lf + η
α
)∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2. (60)
Sum these inequalities over t = 1, . . . , T , to get
T∑
t=0
∥∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1
α
(θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t)
∥∥∥2
≤ 2
T∑
t=0
∥∥∇f(θ¯t)− g∗(θ¯t)∥∥2 + 2(T + 1)L2θ¯
λ0
+
2
α
(
F (θ¯
0
)− F (θ¯T ))
+
(L2f
η
+
Lf + η
α
) T∑
t=0
∥∥θ¯t+1 − θ¯t∥∥2. (61)
Using (54) to bound the last term yields
T∑
t=0
∥∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1
α
(θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t)
∥∥∥2
≤ 2
T∑
t=0
∥∥∥∇f(θ¯t)− g∗(θ¯t)∥∥∥2 + 2(T + 1)L2θ¯
λ0
+
2
α
∆F + β∆F +
β
η
T∑
t=0
∥∥∇f(θ¯t)− g∗(θ¯t)∥∥2
+
β(T + 1)L2
θ¯z

λ0
(62)
12
where β = (
L2f
η +
Lf+η
α )
2α
2−(Lf+η)α . By taking expectation of
both sides of this inequality, we obtain
1
T + 1
E
[ T∑
t=0
∥∥∥g(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1)+ 1
α
(θ¯
t+1 − θ¯t)
∥∥∥2]
≤
( 2
α
+ β
) ∆F
T + 1
+
(β
η
+ 2
)
σ2+
(β + 2)L2
θ¯

λ0
(63)
where we used E[‖∇f(θ¯t) − g∗(θ¯t)‖22] ≤ σ2, which holds
according to Assumption 5. By [26, Theorem 10] and [37],
we know that
− g(θ¯t)− 1
α
(θ¯t+1 − θ¯t) ∈ ∂r¯(θ¯t+1) (64)
which gives
∇f(θ¯t+1)− g(θ¯t)− 1
α
(θ¯t+1 − θ¯t) ∈
∇f(θ¯t+1) + ∂r¯(θ¯t+1) = ∂F (θ¯t+1) (65)
replace this in the left hand side of (63), and recalling the
definition of distance, it holds that
E
[
dist(0, ∂Fˆ (θ¯t
′
))
] ≤( 2
α
+β
)∆F
T
+
(β
η
+2
)
σ2+
(β + 2)L2
θ¯z

λ0
where t′ is randomly drawn from t′ ∈ {1, 2, . . . , T+1}, which
concludes the proof.
C. Proof of Theorem 2
Instead of resorting to an oracle to obtain -optimal solver
for surrogate loss, here we utilize a single step stochastic gra-
dient ascent with mini-batch size M to solve the maximization
step. Consequently, the successive updates become
θ¯t+1 = proxαtr
(
θ¯t − αtgt(θ¯t)
)
(66)
where gt(θ¯t) := 1M
∑M
m=1 g(θ¯
t, ζtm; zm). Let us define
δ(θ¯t) = ∇f(θ¯t) − gt(θ¯t), and use Lf -smoothness of f(θ¯),
to obtain
f(θ¯t+1) ≤ f(θ¯t) + 〈∇f(θ¯t), θ¯t+1 − θ¯t〉
+
Lf
2
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2
≤ f(θ¯t) + 〈gt(θ¯t) + δ(θ¯t), θ¯t+1 − θ¯t〉
+
Lf
2
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2. (67)
Now, substitute θ¯t+1 → u, θt → y, and θ¯t − αtgt(θ¯t) → x
in (45), to arrive at〈
θ¯t − αtgt(θ¯t)− θ¯t+1, θ¯t − θ¯t+1
〉 ≤ αtr¯(θ¯t)− αtr¯(θ¯t+1)
which leads to〈
gt(θ¯t), θ¯t+1 − θ¯t〉 ≤ r¯(θ¯t)− r¯(θ¯t+1)− 1
αt
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2.
(68)
Substituting this into (67), gives
f(θ¯t+1) ≤ f(θ¯t) + 〈δ(θ¯t), θ¯t+1 − θ¯t〉+ Lf
2
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2
+ r¯(θ¯t)− r¯(θ¯t+1)− 1
αt
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2.
Using F (θ) = f(θ) + r¯(θ), we have
F (θ¯t+1)− F (θ¯t) ≤ 〈δ(θ¯t), θ¯t+1 − θ¯t〉
+
(Lf
2
− 1
αt
)
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2. (69)
Using Young’s inequality
〈
δ(θ¯t), θ¯t+1 − θ¯t〉 ≤ 12‖δ(θ¯t)‖2 +
1
2‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2 gives
F (θ¯t+1)−F (θ¯t) ≤
(Lf+1
2
− 1
αt
)
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2 + ‖δ(θ¯
t)‖2
2
.
(70)
Adding the term
〈
θ¯t+1− θ¯t,∇f(θ¯t+1)〉 to both sides in (70)
and simplifying terms yields〈
θ¯t+1 − θ¯t, gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1)〉
≤ −
( 1
2αt
− Lf
2
)
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2 + F (θ¯t)− F (θ¯t+1)
− 〈θ¯t+1 − θ¯t,∇f(θ¯t+1)−∇f(θ¯t)〉. (71)
Completing the squares yields∥∥gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1
αt
(θ¯t+1 − θ¯t)∥∥2
≤ ‖gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1)‖2 + 1
α2t
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2
+
(Lf
αt
− 1
α2t
)
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2 + 2(F (θ¯
t)− F (θ¯t+1))
αt
− 2
αt
〈
θ¯t+1 − θ¯t,∇f(θ¯t+1)−∇f(θ¯t)〉
≤ 2‖gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2 + 2‖∇f(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1)‖2
+
1
α2t
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2 +
(Lf
αt
− 1
α2t
)
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2
+
2(F (θ¯t)− F (θ¯t+1))
αt
− 2
αt
〈θ¯t+1 − θ¯t,∇f(θ¯t+1)−∇f(θ¯t)〉
≤ 2‖gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2 + 2L2f‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2
+
1
α2t
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2 +
(Lf
αt
− 1
α2t
)
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2
+
2(F (θ¯t)− F (θ¯t+1))
αt
+
2Lf
αt
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2
≤ 2‖gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2 + 2(F (θ¯
t)− F (θ¯t+1))
αt
+
3Lf + 2L
2
fαt
αt
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2. (72)
Recalling that δ(θ¯t) = ∇f(θ¯t)− gt(θ¯t), we bound the the
first term as follows
E
[
‖gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2∣∣θt]
= E
[ ∥∥g∗(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t) + δt∥∥2 ∣∣θt]
= ‖g∗(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2 + ‖δt‖2
+ 2E
[ 〈
g∗(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t), δt〉 ∣∣θt] (73)
where the third equality is obtained by expanding the square
term and using E
[〈g∗(θ¯t) − ∇f(θ¯t), δt〉∣∣θ¯t] = 0. We fur-
ther bound right hand side here as follows. Recalling that
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δt = 1M
∑M
m=1 g(θ¯
t, ζtm; zm) − g∗(θ¯t), where g∗(θt) :=
1
M
∑M
m=1∇θ¯ψ(θ¯t, ζ∗tm ; zm), it holds that
E
[
‖δt‖2∣∣θ¯t, ζtm]
= E
[∥∥∥ 1
M
M∑
m=1
[
g(θ¯t, ζtm; zm)− g∗(θ¯t)
]∥∥∥2∣∣∣θ¯t, ζtm]
=
1
M2
M∑
m=1
E
[∥∥∇θ¯ψ(θ¯t, ζtm; zm)
−∇θ¯ψ(θ¯t, ζ∗tm ; zm)
∥∥2∣∣θ¯t, ζtm]
≤ L
2
θz
M2
M∑
m=1
∥∥ζtm − ζ∗tm∥∥2 (74)
where the second equality is because of i.i.d samples
{zm}Mm=1, and last inequality holds due to Lipschitz smooth-
ness of ψ(·). Since ζtm is obtained by a single gradient ascent
update over a µ-strongly concave function, we have that
L2θz
M2
M∑
m=1
∥∥ζtm − ζ∗tm∥∥2 ≤ L2θzM [(1− αtµ)D2 + α2tB2] (75)
where D is the feasible set diameter and αt > 0 is the step
size. The following holds for the expected error term
E
[
‖δt‖2∣∣θ¯t, ζtm] ≤ L2θzM [(1− αtµ)D2 + α2tB2] (76)
using this in (73) to arrive at
E
[
‖gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2∣∣θt] ≤ 2‖g∗(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2
+
L2
θ¯z
M
[
(1− αtµ)D2 + α2tB2
]
. (77)
Substituting the last inequality into (72), to get
E
[∥∥gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1
αt
(θ¯t+1 − θ¯t)∥∥2∣∣θ¯t]
≤ 4‖g∗(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2 + 3Lf + 2L
2
fαt
αt
E
[
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2∣∣θ¯t]
+
2F (θ¯t)− 2E[F (θ¯t+1)∣∣θ¯t]
αt
+
L2
θ¯z
M
[
(1− αtµ)D2 + α2tB2
]
. (78)
Taking again expectation of both sides with respect to θ¯t
E
∥∥∥gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1
αt
(θ¯t+1 − θ¯t)
∥∥∥2
≤ 4E
[
‖g∗(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2
]
+
L2
θ¯z
M
[
(1− αtµ)D2 + α2tB2
]
+ E
[2F (θ¯t)− 2F (θ¯t+1)
αt
+
3Lf + 2L
2
fαt
αt
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2
]
.
(79)
Using our assumption E[‖ψ∗(θ¯t, ζtm; zm)−∇f(θ¯t)‖2] ≤ σ2
and the fact that g∗(θ¯t) = 1M
∑M
m=1ψ(θ¯
t, ζ∗tm ; zm), the first
term on the right hand side can be bounded by 4σ
2
M . For a
fixed learning rate α > 0, summing inequalities (79) from
t = 0, . . . , T yields
1
T + 1
E
[ T∑
t=0
∥∥gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1
αt
(θ¯t+1 − θ¯t)∥∥2]
≤ 2
α(T + 1)
(
F (θ0)− E[F (θT )])
+
3Lf + 2L
2
fα
α
1
T + 1
E
[ T∑
t=0
‖θ¯t+1 − θ¯t‖2
]
+
4σ2
M
+
2L2
θ¯z
M
[
(1− αµ)D2 + α2B2
]
≤ 1
T + 1
{
2
α
+
6Lf + 4L
2
fα
[2− α(Lf + β)]
}
(F (θ¯0)− E[F (θ¯T )])
+
2L2
θ¯z
M
{
1 +
3Lf + 2L
2
fα
2(2− α(Lf + β))
}[
(1− αµ)D2 + α2B2
]
+
4σ2
M
. (80)
Replace F (θ¯0)−F (θ¯T ) with ∆F = F (θ¯0)− inf θ¯ F (θ¯), and
note that gt(θ¯t) − ∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1αt (θ¯t+1 − θ¯t) ∈ ∂F (θ¯t+1),
where ∂F denotes the set of sub gradients of F . It becomes
clear that
E
[
dist(0, ∂F )2
]
≤ 1
T + 1
E
[ T∑
t=0
∥∥∥gt(θ¯t)−∇f(θ¯t+1) + 1
αt
(θ¯t+1 − θ¯t)
∥∥∥2]
≤ ζ
T + 1
∆F +
2L2
θ¯z
ν
N
[
(1− αµ)D2 + α2B2
]
+
4σ2
M
(81)
where ζ = 2α+
6Lf+4L
2
fα
(2−α(Lf+β)) and ν = 1+
3Lf+2L
2
fα
2(2−α(Lf+β)) , which
concludes the proof.
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